MARTIN HEIDEGGER. BEING AND TIME. Translated by. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. I]. BLACI

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PDF | This work is a critical exposition of Martin Heidegger's life, times and exploration into the question of Being. The work surveys the. Also by Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. Discourse on Thinking. Hegel's Concept of Experience. Identity and Difference. What is Called Thinking? On the Way. Dr Peter Critchley Heidegger MARTIN HEIDEGGER: ONTOLOGY AND ECOLOGY Dr Peter Critchley Critchley, P., Martin Heidegger: Ontology and.

The fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals is actually the twofold of nature and culture. Individuals, mortals, gathered together by a common "heritage," by a shared pantheon of gods, refer to culture or community: only by dwelling "in the sight of the gods" does "man become a people Volk " GA 39 It is a space "cleared and free. It follows from this that there are therefore many fourfolds.

The ethics of dwelling involves a combination of localism and universalism. The fourfold in which one dwells is a local fourfold. The ethics of dwelling will therefore vary according to place and person. The primary object of guardianship in the local fourfold is not the universe or the planet, but the particular fourfold to which one belongs.

But to stand in the right relationship to Being, based on "insight into that which is" QCT 47 rather than the illusion of "metaphysics," is to care-for, to become a "guardian" of, the dwelling-place in a universal sense.

The contemporary environmental crisis is, of course, global in character and presents a substantial threat to both nature and culture. The individual can only care-for local place by caring-for the globe. The fourfold is, Heidegger argues, is no mere collection of disconnected entities but evinces a "unity" or "simple oneness. The mutual "mirroring" between earth, sky, gods, and mortals "does not portray a likeness" PLT It is not a matter of picturing but a functional relationship.

Sky and earth are nature, gods and mortals - mortals living in community "before" their gods - are culture. Heidegger argues not only for an intra-natural and of an intra-cultural "mirroring" but also for a mirroring between nature and culture. There is therefore a mutual mirroring between the gods of a people on the one hand, and their sky and earth, on the other. The Heideggerian "gods" mirror nature, since nature determines virtues. Bodenstandigkeit is a fundamental Heideggerian concept, meaning rootedness of life in the soil.

In a radio broadcast entitled "Why do we stay in the Provinces? He argued that his philosophical work is not aloof but belongs in the midst of the peasants' work. It is intimately mated in and related to the life of the peasants. The inner relationship of my own work to the Black Forest and its people comes from a centuries-long and irreplaceable rootedness in the Alemanic-Swabian soil.

The life of the philosopher is "rooted" in the life of the Black Forest peasant, and the life of the peasant is rooted in the thin and impoverished character of the Black Forest "soil. But, if so, one merely inhabits the place, one does not dwell there.

Heidegger was highly critical of the technocratic mentality and the rampant consumerism of contemporary capitalism. However, the problems afflicting the modern world were much more profound than the perversion of reason within capitalist processes of modernisation and addressed the very nature of reason itself. Heidegger locates the will to the rational and technological mastery over nature in the classificatory approach of Western metaphysics since its inception.

This he refers to as nihilism. Denying the idea of a gap between the observer and the observed, Heidegger denies that there can be a perceiving subject who is a spectator of an objective world. Heidegger does not distinguish between consciousness and the external world in coming to examine the data of experience. Heidegger therefore repudiates a disembodied rationalism that is abstracted from human being. As much as reason, feeling and intuition are crucial to philosophical understanding.

A philosopher of ontology, Heidegger begins his study of the totality of being through the analysis of human existence. Whilst human beings cannot deny or alter facticity they are responsible for how this facticity is viewed and for the creation of their future through their own actions. In an inauthentic condition the individual fails to acknowledge the inevitability of death and is overwhelmed by anxiety and fear.

In such a state, human beings come to define themselves as merely passive objects among objects. For Heidegger, the environment confronting human beings consists of objects things and beings that can be used. The relationship of human beings to these objects is characterised by concern. The human being, however, has the capacity to overcome the inauthentic condition and achieve authentic being. In this way, human beings come to appreciate the extent to which they can realize their potential and transform themselves by choice.

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In achieving authenticity the human beings appreciates that what distinguishes the human beings from other beings is uniqueness in being open and responsible for what they are. Such a conception seems plainly mystical. And this meant recovering the proper balance between humanity and nature. Heidegger criticised the anthropocentric approach of Western civilisation since Plato as inducing the technocratic mentality through the will to dominate and conquer nature for human ends.

By conceiving themselves to be apart from and superior to Nature and by seeking freedom, power and happiness through the exploitation of Nature, human beings have inflicted a technological domination upon themselves that has turned all beings including themselves into objective, quantifiable and disposable material. In the modern era the object-character of technological domination spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly and completely..

Heidegger was a forerunner of modern ecology in this respect. In Heidegger wrote: The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such.

But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take care and maintain.

The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it.

Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released for destruction or for peaceful use.

There can be no such mastery. Instead, all beings should be free to display themselves and reach their fruition within nature. For Heidegger, no being, human or otherwise, is at the centre of the world. Heidegger has no truck with the careful husbanding of nature for human ends.

Such notions did not go anywhere near far enough. On the contrary, human beings are part of nature and, as conscious beings capable of creating their future as authentic beings, have a role in saving the earth. Certainly, Heidegger urged people to listen to the soundless voice of being. With such notions Heidegger parts company with the rationalism of Western philosophy and achieves something closer to a passive and receptive opening of oneself to Nature.

One should resist the temptation to find a parallel with Spinoza here. Knowledge is crucial to Spinoza in a way that it is not to Heidegger.

Heidegger renounced eternity in favour of the passing seasons and cycle of life and death on earth. There are many who profess astonishment that ecologists can find so much to praise in Heidegger, a man who never renounced his membership of the Nazi Party. Unavailable beings are modifications of being-handy, not annihilated or if annihilated with what meaning? Consider now the Temporality of the handy.

Handiness has a praesensial meaning which is understood Temporally from the ecstatic-horizonal unity — temporalizing of temporality. Common characterizations of the being of beings re: Praesens is not the same as the present as enpresenting of…. Praesens does not have an ecstatic structure. Praesens is the horizon on which enpresenting projects; prasens completes the time structure of the present as its horizonal schema. Jordan excerpt]. Everything encountered in an enpresenting is understood on the basis of prasens as the horizon already removed to in the ecstasis.

The Temporal interconnections are modified re: Temporality is original self-projection as such. No matter how hidden, temporality is, as the light [Plato] in which things are seen, the condition of everyday circumspective engagement [our original mode of being-in- the-world]. Praesens is the horizonal schema of the ecstasis the present, prior to Dasein which determines the temporalizing of the temporality of dealing with the handy retentive-expectant enpresenting [other ecstatic horizons make other modes of being possible — the horizon of the past — the extant, the horizon of the future - Dasein].

The praesensial schema of handiness, as a specific mode of being, needs to be clarified re: So, handiness is best understood via non-handiness [unavailableness]. Ordinarily the beings we encounter are unobtrusive, not explicitly attended to.

Because of this we do not have them at-hand. We deal with things smoothly because they do not interrupt our dealing with them, so it is possible to lose ourselves in them. The undisturbed character of the handy becomes visible by contrast with a disturbed engagement [broken hammer e. Missing also requires that it, e. Something can only be missing in circumspective letting-function, because such functionality requires in-order- to relations in which we expect a for-what.

Missing is, thus. This helps clarify praesens. Missing is an explicit enpresenting of what is absent; absence is a modification of praesens which makes the handy apparent. Here we engage the problem of the relation of negation to Temporality, i. Hegel saw this saying that being is identical to — belongs with — nothing. It is not an accident that the history of philosophy has converged on the subject. But we found that perception is ambiguous re: Intentionality is neither subjective nor objective.

Unveiledness presupposes an understanding of the being of the entity unveiled, which must be illuminated [by temporality]. In perceivedness being is already concomitantly understood.

So, the being of a being cannot be the perceivedness of the perceived. The directional sense of perception is grounded in enpresenting of something extant. This directional sense can only be understood within the horizon of praesens. This tendency confirms our understanding of being by time.

Temporally interpreted a being is found extant in an enpresenting, but can only be encountered in an enpresenting as something extant if there is a prior intelligibility of the extant in the enpresenting. Denying extantness, for Kant, is removing being with all its predicates. So, Kant defined existence as absolute position, i. Positing does not create the thing. The decisive thing is that the same being is always intended in asserting extantness, but assertional understanding does not look to the thing in order to derive being from it.

Instead, look at what is understood in commerce with beings, viz. Being and beings. This understanding need not be explicit, i. Usually being is treated like a being e. What is that which is as something that is? Being has too often been treated as a being. When the ontological difference is explicitly accomplished, ontology philosophy becomes a science. Science concerns that which is already given by objectifying [Gegenstadlichheit] that which is already somehow unveiled.

Beings are given in the direction tended by existentiell comportment. Positive sciences proceed by objectification of beings in the direction of everyday apprehension.

Being is thus already unveiled in comportment toward beings. Projection of ontological regions — a pre-ontological awareness of being of beings is thus already ontologically available, but is not the same as ontological investigation of the being of beings. Modern science objectifies nature by means of a mathematical projection Galileo. So, objectification of their being is always possible, but, is too indefinite to be explicitly projected. Yet, not completely hidden, but covered over by faulty interpretations, which must be made.

Such interpretations are not defects but steps toward true interpretations. Without knowing where the fault lies, we can think that the temporal interpretation of being is also faulty. History of Philosophy. Even the objectification of being, i. So, philosophy is transcendental science which, in turn, is Temporal science.

The phenomenological method of ontology 1 Ontological propositions are a priori because they are Temporal. A priori means earlier a temporal determination.

The a priori is not prior in common time intratemporality , since earliest in common time comes our encounters with beings. The Temporality of the understanding of being give the means by which an explanation of why ontological determinations are a priori can be given. Understanding demands a precursory projection on time. So, Kantian possibilities are Temporal in their interconnection.

Time, as the origin of possibility as such, is earlier than any other possibility. None of this implies that time is ontically prior [a being] nor eternal.

Learning is recollection, the ascent of the soul to understand being from beings turning around to the light in the cave by conceptual thought. Temporality is only available to conceptual labor not to some mystic [or intellectual] intuition, nor is it merely hypothetically understood without being somehow directly given.

Encouraging two possible errors: These two errors dominate present philosophical thought. Instead, all genuine method must follow the path of that which it discloses — to the matters themselves. So the method must change as progress is made in disclosing its objects. From late 4th- century grammarian Honoratus Maurus, who sought to mock implausible word origins such as those proposed by Priscian. A pun based on the word lucus dark grove having a similar appearance to the verb lucere to shine , arguing that the former word is derived from the latter word because of a lack of light in wooded groves.

Often used as an example of absurd etymology. The Thesis of Modern Ontology: Modern philosophy instead starts from the subject ego as exemplary. How does the ego have predicates? Therefore, the ego is self-consciousness. But it is not one of them, but rather it is linked to them all — the unity in their multiple. Therefore, the ontological characteristic of the ego is as the original synthetic unity of apperception. I do not perceive, but I apperceive the ego. Therefore, for Kant, ontology is the science of possible [a priori] being known of objects.

Therefore the ego is the ground of all being. The ego makes possible is the ontological condition of ontological concepts, a priori. So, the ego is the formal structure of the subject as transcendental. The pure [transcendental or determinant] ego the ontological ground of all possible experience , which is not a fact of experience, is given in apperception.

The pure ego is always only a subject. The pure logical ego [re: Positive characterization: A self-feeling is phenomenologically a mode of revealing p. Yet it is like a feeling since it is not the same as theoretical propositional knowing.

Moral feeling is a making manifest of the ego, in its non-sensible character, as acting feeling of my existence, p.

Therefore, responsibility is determined by something positive which is not empirical but produced by reason. Respect, as a motive, constitutes the condition of possibility of action: Who is this self? Respect, this moral feeling, is the way the ego understands itself, purely, as free of all sensuous determinations. Reason is elevated it raises itself toward itself. The formal structure of respect includes: Respect is dignity before which the self knows itself to be responsible, i.

The ontological constitution of the person as an end-in-itself 1 The moral feeling of respect reveals the self ontically as being an ego factically existent. How is the self defined ontologically, i.

In acting human beings make themselves. The ontological meaning of the moral person made manifest in respect is that a person rational being is an end in itself, its own end, never merely a means. The essentia of persons is to be things res that are ends-in-themselves objective ends — freedom as only limited by themselves not merely relative to some other end.

The categorical imperative [see text p. An end in-itself is an objective end, i. This realm of ends is ontical, i. Yet, Kant distinguishes two kinds of beings, and so two kinds of metaphysics — two ontologies: Kant says the metaphysics of morals investigates the possibilities of a pure will not the empirical will of psychology.

Now we must see the problems — the problem of the ontological constitution of the being we ourselves are — in the matters themselves. Adumbration of the ontological determinations of the moral person but avoidance of the basic problem of its mode of being 1 The person is a thing that exists as its own end.

To persons belongs self- purposiveness: What Kant fails to ask [NB: Respect means being free in free, i. Therefore, the mode of being of the moral self lies in free action. Acting is being extant vorhandensein.

Kant does not ask: What way of being extant does acting represent? The ego is not a thing, rather the ego is acting as a way of being. Therefore, any philosophy [e. The moral person as an interpretation of subjectivity gives no answer regarding the mode of being of the ego. The psychological person is irrelevant here, since it is only an extant thing which is merely an empirical object, not a subject.

He argues that the four classes of categories [quantity, quality, relation, modality] are the only possible resources for giving knowledge of the ego.

Regarding the category of quality: Regarding the category of quantity: Regarding the category of modality: Hence, there are four inferences to be drawn regarding the soul: As self-same in different states at different times, the soul is the person that persists as the ground of changes.

The soul is immortal as spirit not as the ground of life. Why is it impossible to have this ontical knowledge? Argument 1: Experience requires combining what is received in receptivity [i.

But, the ego is spontaneity not affection [i. If the ego is a determinable that is determined by the categories it must be given in sensation. But the ego of apperception cannot be so determined as can the ego as a natural thing, as something vorhanden extant.

This would substitute the empirical ego for the transcendental ego. So, Kant shows that the categories of nature break down re: Perhaps time is the a priori of the ego, i. This would only follow on the assumption that all knowledge of the ego must accept the validity of the criteria of knowledge of nature [which is only vorhandensein].

Kant shows the impossibility of interpreting the transcendental ego as an extant object to which the categories apply, but not that no ontological interpretation is possible. Persons as mental substances, not natural things differ from bodily substances.

But, Kant also sees that it is impossible to conceive of the ego as extant, so the question is how to go beyond Kant to understand the mode of being of the person. Also, ego as spontineity also remains in the horizon of traditional ontology. The analysis of respect attempts to move beyond traditional ontology. Is it extant? Should it be understood as self-available, i. Finite beings exist in reciprocal relations.

We only know the effects on us, not their production by things-in-themselves. Finitude consists in each substance being limited by another substance. And so, a finite substance cannot be just spontaneity, but must also be a receptivity, be affected by other substances. What is the ontological foundation of the claim that finite beings cannot know the true being the substance of other finite beings?

Kant claims that: Therefore, the being of beings is their being-produced. Finite beings have not produced the beings to be known. This is not explicit in Kant, but is taken as self-evident. Production anticipates the being of the being in a model eidos of the being to be created. This anticipation is the true knowledge of the product.

Therefore, the product is only known by its producer who has this model in view. So, God is purely active, i. So, to be a being is to be produced. And so, Kant is still operating within the interpretive horizon of ancient ontology. Thus, consciousness is self-consciousness cf. The being of the Dasein is not merely self-knowing, but also determined by its mode of being. Kant et. So, they were unable to pose the problem of the mode of being of the person - Dasein.

The negative problem is that we need to explicitly reflect on how to ontologically determine the being of Dasein. The fundamental problem of the multiplicity of ways of being and of the unity of the concept of being in general Not only has the question of being been forgotten, but no solution has been given to the question of the unity of ways of being in being in general. Dasein is not an extant thing, Dasein exists, i. We now need to say what this means: Commencement with the subject-object relation res cogitans - res extensa as a mistaking of the existential constitution of the being of those beings who understand being.

It is not enough to state this in a proposition, but instead it is necessary to establish a line of questioning. How is the being of the subject determined without a one-sided subjectivist orientation. Descartes said we are more familiar with the mind than with things. So this seems to overcome one sided subjectivity. Moreover, Natorp fails to allow for different modes of conscioushood, he reduces all differences in consciousness to differences in content [to that of-which an ego is conscious].

But, not merely because of the meanings of the terms. Must natural events be objects to be what they are? Characterizing a being as an object tacitly supposes a subject, i.

This is still too Kantian: Why can there be no objectless subject? The relating to the object belongs to the ontological constitution of the subject; intentionality is a constituent of the subject. To exist means, at least, necessarily to be as comporting with beings. How does the understanding of being belong to intentional behavior? What is the mode of being of this ego-pole? Or a better Q: How in what way is its self given to Dasein? How is Dasein its own, i. So, the associated unveiling of the self belongs to intentionality, as a co-disclosure of the self.

In what way is the self given?

Being and Time

This formal determination is not sufficient to answer the question how this being shows itself to itself in everyday existence. Dasein finds itself primarily in things it cares for, i. In engagement, Dasein is reflected to itself from things. The shoemaker is not the shoe, but gains self- understanding from concern with shoes things.

This being lost is a positive character of Dasein. We are genuinely but inauthentically immersed in things. This is inauthentic [text p. Insofar as Dasein exists and this means insofar as an entity is in such a way that it is in a world there are unveiled, disclosed, uncovered to that entity entities together with the unveiled world. Uncovering anything extant is grounded in that Dasein, as existent, already comports itself to some world that is disclosed.

Existing, it understands something like its world, and with the disclosedness of its world it is itself unveiled for itself at the same time. Self-understanding, this disclosedness of Dasein to itself is attained in fact to begin with by way of the self-understanding taken over from things with which Dasein dwells and which it uncovers in whatever way.

Because this disclosedness -- and at one with it the uncoveredness of entities within the world -- belongs to the essence of Dasein, we can say: Dasein exists through the unveiledness of itself and of the beings toward which it comports itself. Being-in-the-world as foundation of intentionality 1 Q: How is reflection of the self to be philosophically [authentically] interpreted not just the everyday interpretation?

Dasein, as intentional, as directed-towards, is with, i. It does show that Dasein is not a being of the same type as things. How, in what sense, does it transpose itself to be in among objects? Usually philosophy claims things are transcendent, but instead Dasein is transcendence in that Dasein does the transcending [going across] transcendence is a fundamental ontological structure of Dasein, i.

This is viewed unthought in practical circumspection, i. Equipment always refers to a for-which. So equipment has the structure of an in- order-to contexture. This functionality in-order-to, what-for, relevance is a way of being of equipment. Functionality does not just emerge from a relational whole a contexture.

Functionality is pre-understood. We are always already in an environing world Umwelt. Dasein is not just juxtaposed to the wall, nor does Dasein just know it is so juxtaposed, i. Dasein exists as being-in-the- world the hyphens are meant to indicate that this a unity.

But, this does not tell us about world.

Philosophy has not recognized the existential concept of world worldhood, worldliness. The universe of beings can be intraworldly, i. World precedes, is prior to, the sum of beings; world is always already unveiled in advance. World is not a focus of our attention; it is not apprehended.

The pre- philosophical concept of world is the totality of intraworldly things. This presupposes world in the phenomenological sense, as yet undefined. Dasein exists as being-in-the-world. Things, e. A being given to us is not just a thing which we may or may not think nor even a contexture of things.

Dasein, as apprehending extant things, is always already in a world. Idealism, however, may not be false, yet may, at least, pose the philosophical problems realism avoids [dogmatism].

So, the tenability of these views evades decidability. We must, then, first secure the ontology of Dasein to avoid charges of subjectivism. Instead the phenomenon of world challenges the concept of the subject as such. A world is [always already] thrown before us in advance, beforehand. This says that extant entities are always already uncovered. To show: Circumspective being-with things in an environing world is founded in being-in- the-world.

To exist means to be in a world. Historical beings, social institutions, cultural products, etc. Of course, cultural works are able to be even after any historical Dasein ceases to exist.

So, Dasein is never a subjective inner sphere. In another ontical use, the world is that wherein Dasein lives, The reference in this usage is not the same as in The existential-ontological concept of worldhood. The basic characteristic of world whereby wholeness attains its specifically transcendental form of organization is the for-the-sake-of-which.

World, as that to which Dasein transcends, is primarily defined by the for-the-sake-of-which. World-understanding is essentially self-understanding insofar as the relations of in-order-to, of functionality, and of for-the-sake-of are understood through it, and self-understanding is Dasein understanding. Insofar as Dasein is it is occupied with its own capacity to be, i. Dasein is for the sake of its own capacity-to-be-in-the-world. Dasein is its own [mine, no Dasein or action can be perfectly like, but only similar to any other], i.

Authenticity is a modification of inauthenticity, not a destruction of it. Given Heidegger's way of conceiving intentionality, the world exists as Dasein exists. By making itself be in the world, Dasein makes the world exist. By doing so, Dasein's choices [comportments] make it possible for enable Dasein to exist as one of the persons it could have become.

Dasein's choices make it be in the world; they do so as necessary, not as sufficient, conditions for being-in-the-world; being-in-the-world depends on other occurrences as well. When we lose ourselves to things and are among them through intercourse with them then we are inured to our potentiality-to-be as it is conditioned by the feasibility and infeasibility of the things we are concerned with.

Interpretation is to be called authentic when and only when its purpose is to explicate its subject matter as it shows itself to be. It is likely that Heidegger thought that even such interpretation is at risk of erring and probably that what is interpreted will not ever, as interpreted, show itself to be altogether free of errance.

Only if the knowing involved in insight has the primary character of self-understanding does it unveil appropriately that existence of Dasein that is to be unveiled by it. As Dasein's self- projecting, understanding is the basic way that Dasein happens. It is the authentic meaning of action.

Dasein can make this world expressly visible to the degree that it can uncover its own existential possibilities. The Rilke quote shows i a world leaps toward each Dasein from things, as already interpreted.

The subject as self-consciousness is not sufficient as self- reflection by the ego on the ego. We needed to clarify the different possibilities of self-understanding via adequate clarification of the structures of existence. They presuppose functionality in-order- to as their ontological character. How is a functionality-totality understandable? Only if a world is unveiled. Understanding of the being of beings is connected with understanding of world as a presupposition for understanding beings within the world, i.

How can these different ways of being be unified under a single concept of being? We will have to verify the appropriateness of this terminology. It follows that not everything that is not an extant entity is a non-being. Therefore existence belongs to the perfection of this most perfect being. God could not be what he is unless he exists. Major premise: God, by his concept, is the most perfect being. Minor premise: Existence belongs to the concept of the most perfect being.

Therefore, God exists. This gives a negative characterization of existence. A real predicate is a determination, i. Realities are the what-contents of possible things in general regardless of their actuality. Determinations may be affirmative or negative. So, reality means the real determination of a thing res , i. The categories are the different possible forms of unity of combination in judgments categories are not forms molding pre-given material.

The table of judgments [see table] gives all possible form of union from which the categories, the ideas of unity, can be read off.

Reality belongs to each of these forms of unity. An actual x does not differ in its real content from a possible x. Thinking that x exists adds nothing to the thing res. How can being be determined positively, if it is not a real predicate? How does existence differ from being in general? Position is inherently simple [position — place, posit — to place]. Neither absolute nor mere position is a real predicate. In existential assertion the entire conceptual content is posited in relation to the object of the concept — this object is posited absolutely — posited outside the concept.

A possible thing its what-content. How is it posited? But we must ask whether this is adequate, by pushing the Kantian account to its limits to test its clarity. Actuality does not affect the what, but the how of a being. Negatively, actuality is not a real determination, is not itself anything actual. Heidegger will say being [to be] is not a being. Can we understand this more clearly? Is this account justifiable?

Can there be more clarity than this? Is explication itself well founded? Actuality relates to the empirical use of the understanding. Necessity relates the object to reason applied to experience. Modal categories add the faculty of knowledge something subjective to the concept of a thing — actuality adds perception to the concept of a thing.

How is this subjective faculty added to an object? The thing is posited in a relationship of cognition in which the extant thing gives itself in its own self — the real shows itself as an actual entity. Does perception elucidate the concept of existence? Kant fails to clarify the concept of existence re: Does the perceivedness of a being constitute its existence?

It seems not, the object does not exist because I perceive it, rather I perceive it because it exists. Perceivedness presupposes perceivability which requires the existence of the perceived being. Hence, perception is the mode of access to the extant, the way it is uncovered, but uncoveredness is not the extantness of the extant, which already belongs to the extant being before it is uncovered explaining why it is uncoverable.

Similarly re: What is the source of this orientation that makes position possible? Positedness is how the positing entity confirms the being of that entity. We clarify these by means of what makes the comportments of cognitive powers possible [text p. Perhaps, a less crude psychology might provide the factual basis for a more detailed clarification. Geometry still makes use of ontological presuppositions what constitutes the being of its objects it cannot account for. The inaccessibility of the constitution of the being of their domains applies even more to the factual sciences, e.

In contrast, philosophy takes the a priori as such as its theme. Kant needed, not facts, but a better a priori understanding of the ontology of Dasein. Intentionality and transcendence 0 b.

This leaves the comportments of the ego — Dasein — undefined. So, it is unrecognized an adequate treatment of the ontology of Dasein is presupposed to clarifying what it means to be. Perception has a three fold meaning: This three fold division goes back to the thing which is itself signified by the ambiguous term "perception": This is not a tautology.

Perception and the perceived belong together in the perceivedness of the perceived [text]. The belonging together of a , b , and c has the character of directedness toward, which constitutes the whole framework of perception.

This may seem but is not trivial. Husserl first elucidated the nature of this structure in Logical Investigations and Ideas. Intentionality comprises both moments - intentio and intentum - within its unity. The two moments are different in each comportment and their diversity constitutes the diversity of comportments. How is intentionality grounded ontological in the constitution of Dasein. Given this naturalistic conception, vary these: Only because hallucinatory [illusory] perception is intrinsically a comporting-toward can something be intended in an illusory way, perceiving, e.

Hence, intentionality lies in the comportment: How do these subjectivities relate to objectivities? What can this immanent relation contribute to the philosophical elucidation of transcendence [text p. How can experiences transcend [get outside] the subjective sphere? The interpretation misses the phenomenon of intentionality. That is pure theory. This like transcendence must be determined in their essence on the basis intentionality.

B The usual separation between subject and object is a construct and occasions more constructions and errors therefore let us say "Dasein" not "subject" C The mode of being of the Dasein is always already dwelling with the extant. Dasein exists not like an extant thing but as comportment towards extant things. Dasein mode of being is to take every being as extant.

However, the being to which this neither subjective nor objective phenomenon, intentionality, belongs Dasein must be conceived differently. Uncoveredness perceivedness of beings and disclosedness of being 1 Transition and summary: Insofar as perceivedness is a necessary not sufficient condition of access to the extant, we need to characterize perceivedness as such.

The extant in its functionality Bewandtniis e. Perceivedness likr ways of being extant, extantness what it means to be extant , cannot be real determinations of the thing. Phenomenological methodological maxims p. Therefore, an answer to the question what it means to be requires an ontological analysis of Dasein. End — discussion of the other three of the four theses.

Exposition and general division of the theme I We will be investigating the subject matter of phenomenology, trying to solve its basic problems rather than studying phenomenology as an activity. A It is not enough to derive these problems from current conceptions of phenomenology, because these conceptions may not have captured the most important philosophical problems.

B Phenomenology has been thought of as a preparation for solving traditional philosophical problems in the traditional philosophical disciplines. A Since its inception, philosophy has been thought of as the most fundamental science including all other sciences and out of which all other sciences emerge. The concept of philosophy: A World-views may be acquired consciously or by habituation. How a world-view is acquired or justified is irrelevant to its status as a world- view. B World-views are culturally and historically determined.

D World-views are practical attitudes which direct behavior.

They are not a set of theoretical claims not in memory as a bunch of cognitive properties. II Philosophy is popularly thought of as an attempt to develop a world-view, and any philosophy that does not do so is thought to be worthless. A A world-view always arises out of a specific actual historical set of factical possibilities for thought and attitude. III Every world-view is positively related to some actual being s , an existing world and a particular Dasein.

What ought I do? What can I hope for? What is man? B The world-view conception of philosophy is inadequate because: IV These reasons hold only if philosophy does not posit i. B For scientific philosophy to be possible, then, there must be something given es gibt which is not a being. Philosophy as science of being I Philosophy is ontology; the science of being rather than of beings. B As ontology, philosophy interprets being, its structure and possibilities conceptually.

C All non-philosophical sciences are about beings which are taken as given for investigation. A We may easily think of beings e. So, everyone, not just philosophers think being. C Common sense, which says that since being is the simplest concept it needs no definition, is not to be trusted in philosophy, since common sense depends on the authority of local traditions [philosophy as inverted world]. D Instead, elucidating the significance of being and the possibility of understanding being are the most difficult and urgent tasks of philosophy.

The four theses about being and the basic problems of phenomenology I We will investigate four theses about being that have been advocated in the history of philosophy: A These theses, to be studied in Part I, are: B These theses are connected to the basic question of the meaning of being in general as Temporality , which will be studied in Part II.

II How is being to be investigated? A The human Dasein is a being which exists in an understanding of being in its comportments intentionality towards beings. B Understanding how it is possible to understand being will point us toward an understanding of the question of the meaning of being as such. An analytic of the ontology of the human Dasein will help us pose the question of the meaning of being.

Three Mistakes of My Life by Chetan Bhagat

The ontological constitution of the human Dasein is found in temporality a more fundamental concept than the ordinary concept of time. C In order to investigate being we must make clear the difference between being and beings — the ontological difference. D We must ask whether the dogmatic assumption of the 2nd thesis Being is articulated into a what and a way of being can be grounded in the meaning of being as Temporality.

E Regarding the third thesis we must ask whether there are different ways of being and if so how it is possible for being to be a unified concept [NB: Aristotle showed that Being is not a category — cf. Metaphysics B III 3.

It is necessary to understand the connections of being and truth through an understanding of Dasein. This shows that the provisional investigations of Part I are not arbitrarily chosen nor a product of our theories, but emerge out of the matters themselves. The character of ontological method: The three basic components of phenomenological method I Phenomenology is the method that must be used if ontology is to be investigated scientifically. A The method of an ontology directed towards being, is completely different from the methods appropriate to other sciences which are directed towards beings.

Only through Dasein, which understands being and so is open to the truth of being, can being be given. B The method of ontology must also be clear about the form of knowing appropriate to ontology. Hence phenomenology is the method of ontology, of scientific philosophy in general.

Phenomenology is the method for comprehending being conceptually, for grasping it in terms of its possibilities, i. A This task has always been part of Western philosophy. B There are three components of the phenomenological method: This construction consists in the free projection of a being onto its being: C Phenomenological construction is always also a de-constructing of traditional philosophical concepts.

In Part III phenomenology as the method of scientific ontology will make the nature of philosophy clearer and return us to the beginning of our investigation. Outline of the course: The static supersensible world which supposedly lay under phenomena is inverted so that a 2nd dynamic supersensible world is now determinate in that it is a principle of movement and change… Like in one world is unlike in the other and vise versa.The categorical imperative [see text p.

C Phenomenological construction is always also a de-constructing of traditional philosophical concepts. Asserting is an intentional comportment of Dasein, i.

This leaves the comportments of the ego — Dasein — undefined. II How is being to be investigated? How can being be determined positively, if it is not a real predicate? Regarded by many as the general law of human history at the time, the idea of progress presupposed the unity of time in the world, which became both a theoretical foundation and a point of departure of modern historiography.